



Simple Ways to Forecast Inﬂ  ation: 
What Works Best? 
Brent H. Meyer and Mehmet Pasaogullari
There are many ways to forecast the future rate of inﬂ  ation, ranging from sophisticated statistical models involving hun-
dreds of variables to hunches based on past experience. We generate a number of forecasts using a simple statistical 
model and an even simpler estimating rule, adding in various measures thought to be helpful in predicting the course 
of inﬂ  ation. Then we compare their forecast accuracy. We ﬁ  nd that no single speciﬁ  cation outperforms all others over 
all time periods. For example, the median and 16 percent trimmed-mean measures outperform all other speciﬁ  cations 
during the 1990s, and survey-based inﬂ  ation expectations seem to do better during volatile periods.
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Just about everybody pays attention to inﬂ  ation and 
wonders when prices are going up, and by how much. 
Households and businesses need estimates of future prices 
to make well-informed decisions. Policymakers, whose job 
is to aid in those decisions by promoting stable prices, need 
accurate forecasts in order to monitor inﬂ  ation and make 
course corrections when necessary. 
To get a glimpse into the probable future, one can use a 
statistical model. In this Commentary, we investigate a few 
simple versions of these to forecast Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) inﬂ  ation, along with some even-simpler rules of 
thumb. We start with univariate forecasting techniques. 
Then, in an effort to improve these forecasts, we investigate 
the forecasting properties of other variables that are thought 
to affect inﬂ  ation—economic slack, underlying inﬂ  ation, 
and survey measures of expected inﬂ  ation. We compare 
the forecast accuracy of a number of different speciﬁ  cations 
with variants of all of these. 
We ﬁ nd that there isn’t just one dominant speciﬁ  cation that 
outperforms all other forecast models in every time period. 
Also, over the past ten years, simple statistics—such as an-
nual inﬂ  ation rates in alternative price-change measures and 
inﬂ  ation expectations obtained from surveys—turn out to be 
more informative than the statistical models we tested. 
A Starting Point
Inﬂ  ation tends to be a relatively persistent process, which 
means that current and past values should be helpful in 
forecasting future inﬂ  ation. Applying that intuition, we 
construct two basic models that exploit information embed-
ded in past values of CPI inﬂ  ation. Each uses a different 
technique to forecast CPI inﬂ  ation over the year ahead: 
One is based on regression analysis and the other is based 
on the naïve speciﬁ  cation made popular by Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001). Later, we add and switch out different 
variables and different ways of measuring these variables 
to get other speciﬁ  cations.
The ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation is a regression that forecasts one-year-
ahead CPI inﬂ  ation using lags of the CPI (speciﬁ  cally, past 
values of the quarterly annualized percent change in the 
CPI).1 We estimate this regression in a recursive manner, 
starting with a sample that includes 40 quarters of data and 
adds an additional data point to the sample in each succes-
sive quarter.2 This approach is equivalent to saying that the 
next year’s inﬂ  ation is a function of all past values of inﬂ  a-
tion up to 4 quarters before. The regression analysis ﬁ  gures 
out the parameters of that function.





















Regression with CPI inﬂ  ation 0.98 2.18 2.31 0.96 2.39 2.00 1.27 1.79 2.00 1.89






















Regression with annualized 
growth rate of real GDP
0.93 2.09 2.15 0.88 2.39 1.85 1.21 1.78 2.00 1.82
Different measures of inﬂ  ation           
Regression with core CPI inﬂ  ation  3.12 2.51 1.00 1.46  1.12 1.29 1.28  
Naïve forecast with core CPI 
inﬂ  ation
0.76 3.27 2.51 0.93 1.47 2.64 1.11 1.25 1.24 2.03
Regression with median CPI 
inflation
   2.48 1.22 1.57  1.37 1.51 1.48  
Naïve forecast with median CPI 
inﬂ  ation
 2.91 2.02 0.78 1.50  0.98 1.19 1.29  
Regression with 16% trimmed-
mean CPI inﬂ  ation
   2.34 1.11 1.66  1.23 1.47 1.47  
Naïve forecast with 16% trimmed-
mean CPI inﬂ  ation
 2.84 2.07 0.77 1.57  0.97 1.21 1.33  
Inﬂ  ation expectations           
Regression with UM inﬂ  ation 
expectations
    0.92 1.85     1.59  
Regression with SPF inﬂ  ation 
expectations
     1.37     1.21  
Naïve forecast with UM inﬂ  ation 
expectations
   1.51 0.88 1.74   0.92 1.32 1.49  
Naïve forecast with  SPF inﬂ  ation 
expectations
    0.81 1.37  0.97 1.15 1.22  
Table 2.  Accuracy of Forecasts Based on Alternative Speciﬁ  cations (in Root Mean Squared Errors) 
Notes: For simplicity, we report only the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) from the highest-performing economic activity speciﬁ  cation, given that the relative perfor-
mance of this set of variables diminished after the 1980s. The speciﬁ  cation with the lowest RMSE in each time period is highlighted in green.
Note: The speciﬁ  cation with the lowest root mean squared error (RMSE) in each time period is highlighted in green.
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inﬂ  ation using a naïve speciﬁ  cation, in which the fore-
cast over the year ahead is simply the past four-quarter 
growth rate in the CPI. For example, the four-quarter 
growth rate in the CPI stands at 1.2 percent through the 
third quarter of 2010. Using the naïve technique, 1.2 
percent becomes our forecast for inﬂ  ation over the next 
four quarters (through the third quarter of 2011). This 
approach is equivalent to saying that inﬂ  ation over the 
upcoming year is most likely to be what it was in the past 
year up to that point.
Because it is possible that the underlying inﬂ  ation process 
has changed over time, we test the forecasting performance 
of these models over a variety of time periods. We ﬁ  rst ex-
amine forecast accuracy by decade, starting in 1960. Next, 
since monetary policy changed in the 1980s, we break the 
data series into two time periods, one pre-1983 and one 
post-1983. The inﬂ  ation process may have been altered fol-
lowing a period of disinﬂ  ation in the early to mid-1980s—
commonly referred to as the “Volcker-era” disinﬂ  ation—af-
ter which both inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation expectations became 
less volatile. We also break out the 1984–2006 time period 
(excluding the last four years) to see what has happened to 
forecast accuracy over the most recent period, which includes 
the 2007–2009 recession. The last time period we examine 
is from 1995–2010, which allows us to examine measures 
of inﬂ  ation expectations as predictors of inﬂ  ation for time 
periods over which we have limited data. 
To compare the accuracy of these speciﬁ  cations, we com-
pute the root mean squared error (RMSE) statistic, a mea-
sure of forecast error, for each. A RMSE of 0 indicates a 
perfect forecasting performance, and positive values reﬂ  ect 
deviations between the forecasted values and the realized 
values. The higher the RMSE, the higher the deviation 
between the forecasted values and the realized values on 
average. Table 1 reports the forecast accuracy for our 
backward-looking regression and naïve speciﬁ  cation. 
There are a couple of patterns to note from table 1. First, 
neither model consistently outperforms the other across 
different time periods, although the naïve method deﬁ  -
nitely has the upper hand. Second, the forecasting perfor-
mance of these speciﬁ  cations, which depend only on past 
inﬂ  ation, varies appreciably across different time periods 
and has deteriorated over the last four years. 
The implication of this recent deterioration in forecast-
ing performance is that inﬂ  ation seems to be explained 
to a lesser extent by past inﬂ  ation than it used to be. An 
explanation for that deterioration could be that the under-
lying inﬂ  ation process has changed. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and 
Paustian (2007) suggest, for example, that inﬂ  ation has 
become less persistent. The loss of explanatory power by 
lagged inﬂ  ation could also be tied, in part, to the energy 
price shock in mid-2008. By the third quarter of 2008, the 
four-quarter growth rate in the CPI had jumped up to  
5.3 percent (a 17-year high), only to fall below 0.0 percent a 
mere two quarters later. A dramatic swing like that had not 
been experienced in the recent past, and it probably contrib-
uted to a larger forecast error, since backward-looking mea-
sures could not have accounted for such extreme variation. 
Can We Do Better?
We attempt to improve on the forecasts that depend only on 
past inﬂ  ation by incorporating three other types of informa-
tion into the basic models. First, we add different measures 
of economic activity into the regression.3 The approach is 
common, and this kind of speciﬁ  cation is sometimes referred 
to as a Phillips curve. 
Second, we investigate measures of underlying or core 
inﬂ  ation (such as the median CPI), statistics which attempt 
to lessen some of the volatility in the headline CPI, thereby 
extracting a more precise inﬂ  ation trend. 
Finally, we see if survey measures of inﬂ  ation expectations 
have any useful predictive content. 
The measures of economic activity that we add are those 
that are thought to improve inﬂ  ation forecasts: real GDP, 
unemployment, industrial production, manufacturing 
production, and capacity utilization. Measures of economic 
activity are thought to be useful in forecasting inﬂ  ation, with 
the underlying pace of expansion, or robustness of growth 
putting pressure on prices. For example, when output is 
rising at a fast pace or the unemployment rate is relatively 
low, prices in general often rise, leading to higher rates of 
inﬂ  ation. Conversely, periods when growth is slow or the 
unemployment rate is high tend to be disinﬂ  ationary. 
One way to exploit this relationship when forecasting is to 
use “gaps”—or deviations from a trend—because they can 
indicate exceptional variation. Another is to look at growth 
rates, where faster growth rates tend to be associated with 
higher inﬂ  ation rates and vice versa. We use deviations from 
trend and growth rates of the economic variables in the 
regressions.4 
Measures of underlying inﬂ  ation may more accurately 
uncover trend inﬂ  ation than the headline measure, so they 
may be more useful in forecasting. In any given period there 
can be a substantial amount of noise in the overall CPI, 
which can arise from a myriad of issues including seasonal 
adjustment issues, measurement problems, and idiosyncratic 
price changes (such as excise tax increases). This noise can 
obscure the signal from past headline inﬂ  ation and may lead 
to poor forecasts. Economists and forecasters frequently try 
to eliminate that noise in an attempt to uncover the underly-
ing inﬂ  ation trend, what is often called core inﬂ  ation. 
We test three measures of core CPI inﬂ  ation in place of 
the past headline inﬂ  ation. The ﬁ  rst, and most common 
measure of underlying inﬂ  ation, the core CPI, is the CPI 
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ing alternatives we examine. This result may be related to 
the relatively high volatility of that time period and may sug-
gest that the loss of predictive power was due to the relative 
stability of the economy over the past 30 years or so (up 
until recently). 
Core Inﬂ  ation Measures. Generally, it appears that these 
measures of underlying inﬂ  ation are useful when forecasting 
inﬂ  ation. Moreover, it seems that the predictive ability of 
this set of speciﬁ  cations has improved recently relative to the 
techniques reported in table 1. During the 1980s the low-
est RMSE is only 10 percent better than the speciﬁ  cations 
that just use past values of headline inﬂ  ation, while over the 
past 10 years the lowest RMSE is roughly 25 percent bet-
ter. Moreover, just paying attention to less noisy measures 
of underlying inﬂ  ation, like the naïve forecasts from the 
four-quarter percent change in the median and 16 percent 
trimmed-mean CPI measures, tends to be more useful than 
a Phillips curve speciﬁ  cation that includes lagged inﬂ  ation 
and economic activity measures (except during the 1970s).7 
Also, it looks as if the naïve speciﬁ  cations of this type gener-
ally outperform the forecasts stemming from the estimated 
regressions. 
Inﬂ  ation Expectations. Similar to Ang, Bekaert, and Wei 
(2007), we ﬁ  nd that survey measures of inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions tend to outperform other, more standard, inﬂ  ation-
forecasting speciﬁ  cations. The most striking result is the 
relative performance of the naïve forecast constructed with 
the median expectation from the University of Michigan’s 
Survey of Consumers. Over the 1980s, it had a RMSE of 
1.51, roughly 25 percent better than the next closest RMSE 
of 2.02, which belongs to the naïve forecast from the me-
dian CPI. We ﬁ  nd the timing of this superior performance 
particularly interesting, because it corresponds to the period 
during which the Fed started and pursued a strategy to 
reduce the rate of inﬂ  ation. 
Expectations measures might pick up on the 1980s disinﬂ  a-
tion better than other approaches because statistical models 
can’t detect new directions that break with past relation-
ships. Since statistical models exploit past relationships 
between variables, their forecasts are more persistent. At 
signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  ection points, these forecasts are persistently 
wrong, whereas individuals are free to use judgment to 
discern if those relationships have changed. In the early 
part of the 1980s, inﬂ  ation was running in the double digits, 
and the Federal Open Market Committee, with Chairman 
Volcker at the helm, increased the federal funds rate to, 
at one point, nearly 20 percent in order to tame inﬂ  ation. 
Individuals appear to have adjusted to the change in policy 
and started to expect lower, more stable inﬂ  ation. Statisti-
cal methods could not detect this policy change as quickly, 
leading to the better forecasting performance of expectations 
measures over that time period. 
minus food and energy. As the name implies, this measure 
excludes two of the most historically volatile components—
food and energy prices. However, Bryan and Cecchetti 
(1993) argue that volatility (noise) can arise from any 
component during a given period (usually a month), and 
by trimming (or excluding) the most volatile monthly price 
changes, a clearer signal of underlying inﬂ  ation can be un-
covered. Two such trimmed-mean statistics are the median 
CPI and the 16 percent trimmed-mean CPI, and we test 
these as well.
We incorporate the different measures of core inﬂ  ation into 
both of our model types. In the regression speciﬁ  cation, we 
use current and past values of the core inﬂ  ation measures as 
explanatory variables.5 We create alternative naïve speci-
ﬁ  cations by incorporating the trailing four-quarter percent 
change in each core inﬂ  ation measure. 
Finally, we investigate two readily available survey measures 
of one-year-ahead inﬂ  ation expectations, the median expec-
tation from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Con-
sumers (hereafter UM) and the median expectation for  
CPI inflation from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel- 
phia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). 
These measures are intriguing as forecasting tools, as it 
is highly plausible that, given wage and price stickiness, 
individuals embed expectations of future inﬂ  ation into their 
price-setting and decision-making behavior today. In fact, if 
you’ve read or listened to a Federal Reserve ofﬁ  cial lately, 
chances are you’ve probably heard something to the effect  
of “…inﬂ  ation expectations matter.” Indeed, central bank-
ers’ sensitivity to inﬂ  ation expectations seems warranted, as 
it is theoretically possible that expectations can be self-ful-
ﬁ  lling prophecies. However, we are mainly interested in the 
forecasting properties of these measures here.
Just as we do for the alternative measures of inﬂ  ation, we 
incorporate the two measures of inﬂ  ation expectations into 
our two basic models. The regression uses the current me-
dian expectation as an explanatory variable, and the naïve 
speciﬁ  cations simply assume the median expectation will be 
the future year-ahead rate of inﬂ  ation.6 
Which Gives the Best Forecast?
Table 2 details the RMSEs for the different speciﬁ  cations, 
reporting only the highest-performing measures from each 
type of additional variable (economic activity, core inﬂ  ation, 
and inﬂ  ation expectations) to save space. 
Economic Activity. As was the case with the speciﬁ  cations 
that just depended on past inﬂ  ation, the forecasting per-
formance of activity measures varies markedly over time. 
Moreover, the inclusion of activity measures, particularly 
the annualized quarterly growth rate in real GDP, seemed 
to improve upon the speciﬁ  cations that depend just on past 
inﬂ  ation only from the 1970s to the 1990s. For the 1970s, 
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of Professional Forecasters also tend to forecast relatively 
well, compared to other speciﬁ  cations we tested…and 
thank goodness! It might be a little embarrassing if profes-
sional forecasters, who not only employ more sophisticated 
inﬂ  ation forecasting models than we’ve investigated here 
but also have years of experience to shape their judgment, 
ended up with relatively poor forecasts. That said, the naïve 
UM forecast did outperform the naive SPF forecast from 
1984 to 2006, though that difference was negligible. How-
ever, inﬂ  ation was relatively stable over that time period, 
and that could be driving those results. Perhaps more 
importantly, by including the most recent data that encom-
pass the 2007-09 recession (a relatively volatile time period 
for headline CPI inﬂ  ation), the RMSE for the naïve SPF 
forecast is about 15 percent more accurate than the forecast 
from the naïve University of Michigan speciﬁ  cation.
Conclusion
While this exercise was rather simple, it did yield some 
interesting results. First, there doesn’t seem to be a single 
speciﬁ  cation that outperforms all others over all time pe-
riods. Second, “naïve” speciﬁ  cations (other than the naïve 
forecast using the headline CPI) seem to perform well com-
pared to simple statistical models, and during some periods, 
forecast signiﬁ  cantly better. For example, the naïve forecasts 
from the median and 16 percent trimmed-mean measures 
outperform all other speciﬁ  cations during the 1990s.
Finally, inﬂ  ation expectations appear to forecast future 
inﬂ  ation rather well, yielding the lowest RMSE in every 
time period for which we have data but one. Over some 
time periods, especially during the 1980s, a signiﬁ  cant 
inﬂ  ection point for inﬂ  ation, expectations-based speciﬁ  ca-
tions forecast exceedingly well relative to the other speciﬁ  -
cations we tested.
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Footnotes
1. We estimate this regression using OLS with quarterly 
data on the CPI from 1947:Q1 to 2010:Q2. Following 
Stock and Watson (1999), we estimate the following regres-
sion: 4   – t =  + (L)(t – t–1) + t.
Here,       is the four-quarter ahead annual inﬂ  ation, t is the 
annualized quarterly inﬂ  ation, and (L) is the lag polynomi-
al operator. We include the current value and the ﬁ  rst four 
lags in this lag polynomial.
2. Another possible approach is to estimate the model over 
rolling sample windows (typically 10 years or 40 quarters at 
a time). We tried this technique as well and obtained quali-
tatively similar results.
3. We alter that ﬁ  rst regression slightly here by allowing the 
lags of inﬂ  ation and lagged measures of economic activity 
to vary independently, choosing the “optimal” lag length 
using the Bayesian information criterion with a maximum 
lag length of four quarters. The regression equation is the 
following:
4   – t =  + (L)(t – t–1) + (L)xt + t.
Here, xt is the activity measure.
4. The gaps for each measure of economic activity are ob-
tained with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  lter.
5. Here we are using a slightly different regression than our 
ﬁ  rst regression, which included headline CPI, because of its 
performance:
4  =  + (L)* + t.
*  is the different measure of inﬂ  ation. We allow a maxi-
mum lag length of four quarters, with the “optimal” lag 
length chosen by the Bayesian information criterion.
6. The regression that uses expectations as the explanatory 
variable is the following:
4   =  + 0e
         . 
e
      is today’s expectations for four quarters ahead.
7. This prompted us to test a set of Phillips curves that 
include these alternative underlying inﬂ  ation measures 
and different measures of economic slack. Interestingly, we 
found that the inclusion of slack measures did little to im-
prove upon the forecasting performance of the underlying 
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